Under imperfect competition, the eect of a cap-and-trade system on industry prots depends on the type of abatement technology that is used by rms: industries that use process-integrated technologies are more aected than those using end-of-pipe abatement technologies. The interaction between environmental policy and the evolution of the market structure is then studied. In particular, a reserve of pollution permits for new entrants is justied when the industry uses a process-integrated abatement technology, while a system with a preemption right may be justied in the case of end-of-pipe abatement technology. JEL Classication: L13, Q53, Q58.
Introduction
An issue common to the implementation of environmental regulations (e.g., regarding a market for pollution permits or an environmental tax) concerns the acceptability of such regulation by the agents aected by it. A cap-and-trade system, in particular, is likely to fail if the industries concerned by the said system lobby against it. This may happen if industry prots fall as a result of the cap-and-trade system. Judging by the results of the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), however, it is not clear what the eect of a cap-and-trade system on rms' prots will be. The cap-and-trade system may in fact benet some industries, in which case the issue of whether the system is acceptable to rms should not even be raised.
In this paper, we focus on oligopolistic markets facing a cap-and-trade system. We show that the type of pollution abatement technology that is used in an industry has a strong impact on the way the cap-and-trade system aects the product market equilibrium. From this, we derive two sets of conclusions. First, prots are aected dierently by the cap-and-trade system depending on the type of abatement technology at hand in the industry. In some cases, rm prots may increase with the price of permits.
Second, entry to the market aects the price of permits dierently depending on the type of abatement. This implies that the policy regarding entry (and in particular the implementation of a reserve of permits) should be contingent on the type of abatement technology.
During the rst two phases of the EU ETS, less than 10% of all pollution permits were auctioned, while the rest were grandfathered (i.e., granted for free regardless of the rms' output). This approach was widely criticized, as it led, in some cases, to an increase in prots (Grubb and Neuho, 2006, Ellerman and Joskow, 2008) . Focusing on the steel industry, Demailly and Quirion (2008) argue that not more than 50% of the permits should have been granted for free in order to compensate for prot losses.
More important, there is some evidence that prots in the power industry would have increased even if all the permits had been auctioned (Sijm et al., 2006) . Although all industries seemed to benet from having too many free allowances, the impact of the EU ETS prior to such allowances varied considerably among industries.
We argue that one of the reasons for this variation is the variety of abatement technologies and their availability, or lack thereof, in the dierent industries. Any industry has access to various types of abatement technologies. However, some abatement technologies are relatively more available in some industries, as illustrated by Anderson and Newell (2003), for example, who argue that the cost of using capture and storage depends to a great extent on the type of industry.
Following Requate (2005) , we consider two types of technologies: end-of-pipe abatement and process-integrated abatement. End-of-pipe abatement corresponds to capture and storage systems, pollution lters and clean development mechanisms, all of which are mainly independent of production decisions.
1 Process-integrated abatement involves a process investment that rms incur to reduce their marginal cost of producing the nal good. Examples of this type of abatement are shifting to a cleaner technology or reducing the energy intensity of production.
We study the eect of a cap-and-trade system in which all permits are auctioned o on the product market equilibrium, depending on the abatement technology at hand in the industry. To do so, we make two types of comparison. We rst compare each technology to a benchmark case in which rms do not have access to abatement. Then, we compare the two technologies to one another, focusing on a case in which the same level of abatement in equilibrium yields the same total cost of abatement for both technologies. We focus on Cournot competition.
In the benchmark case without abatement, the eect of the cap-and-trade system is simply to assign a monetary value to pollution and hence to increase the opportunity 3 cost of production, which in turn increases nal prices. Under a monopoly market structure or perfect competition, this would automatically reduce rms' prots. With imperfect competition in the product market, however, the production cost increase that follows an increase in the price of permits may have a counter-intuitive eect, as initially emphasized by Seade (1985) : when the slope of the demand function is suciently inelastic, it may indeed increase rms' prots (not taking abatement into account).
Comparing each technology to the benchmark, we obtain dierent eects. With endof-pipe abatement, access to abatement does not aect the decisions of rms on the product market. Indeed, reducing pollution (that is, "producing" emission reduction) is a new activity, the protability of which is independent from the production of the nal good. Firms abate their pollution up to the point where the marginal cost of abatement equals the price of permits. The higher the price of permits is, the more protable this new activity is. In parallel, the eect of a cap-and-trade system on the product market prot is exactly the same as if there were no abatement. Therefore, in the standard case, in which rms' product market prots decrease following an increase in the permit price, a cap-and-trade system has two contradictory eects, and total prots may increase as a result of the system. In contrast, in the case of process-integrated technology, abatement amounts to reducing the marginal cost of production and is therefore not independent of production. In that case, the production cost always increases to a lesser degree following an increase in the permit price than without abatement: the total eect on prots, whether positive or negative, is thus smaller with process-integrated abatement than without abatement.
Comparing the two technologies, we then nd that in standard cases (when product market prots decrease with the price of permits), rms are always better o using end-of-pipe abatement than using process-integrated abatement. In the less common 4 case, in which an increase in the permit price increases the product market prot, then it is unclear which technology is better from the point of view of rms. We know, however, that with end-of-pipe abatement rms' prots always increase with the price of permits, whereas with process-integrated abatement rms' prots may increase or decrease following an increase in the price of permits.
Our model thus predicts that the impact of a cap-and-trade system on industry protability is quantitatively and qualitatively dierent according to the type of abatement technology at hand in the industry. As an implication for policy, the criteria for allocating grandfathered free allowances (a common tool to compensate rms' prot losses due to the cap-and-trade system) must depend on abatement technologies.
2 We extend this result to price competition and to a framework with international competition, assuming the presence of a competitive fringe of foreign rms that are not subject to the cap-and-trade system.
A second contribution concerns the adjustment of the global pollution cap to entry.
The EU plans to set aside 5% of all the European emission permits for new entrants and to grant part of this amount for free. The reserve for entrants is ordinarily justied to encourage competition in the market for products. Here, we consider the case in which the regulator implements a Pigovian permit price, and we analyze how the cap of permits should be adjusted to entry.
The two aforementioned abatement technologies have dierent eects on the equilibrium permit price: the cap of permits may increase or decrease with the number of rms with end-of-pipe abatement, whereas it should always increase with competition with process-integrated abatement. We thus provide a new justication for the existence of a reserve of permits for potential entrants, 3 especially with the process-integrated abatement. In contrast, in cases in which the regulator should reduce the cap of permits when rms enter the market, we propose a dierent system: if necessary, the regulator may buy permits from incumbents with a preemption right and sell or give a share of these to entrants.
The structure of the article is as follows: We start by relating the paper to the literature in Section 2. Section 3 describes our model. In Section 4, we determine the eect of the implementation of pollution permits on rms' prots, depending on their abatement technology, and extend our analysis to price competition and international competition. In Section 5, we determine the adjustment of the global pollution cap to entry. Section 6 concludes.
Relation to the Literature
The paper contributes to three strands of the literature.
First, the paper contributes to the literature on the eect of a marginal cost increase on prots under quantity competition. Seade (1985) rst established that an increase in rms' marginal cost can increase their prots if the slope of the demand function is suciently elastic. Kimmel (1992) extends this analysis to an oligopoly where rms face dierent costs of production but are subject to an identical negative shock. Février and Linnemer (2004) synthesize this literature by studying a general framework with heterogeneous costs and idiosyncratic shocks. Kotchen and Salant (2011) analyze the impact of a tax on industry prots in the context of a common-pool resource and highlight some analogues with Seade's analysis. We contribute to this literature by introducing two dierent abatement technologies and analyzing the eect of an environmental regulation on prots, which can be understood as a common shock on rms' production costs. We show in particular that the use of process-integrated technology diminishes the eect (positive or negative) emphasized by Seade (1985) . In the case of end-of-pipe abatement, the introduction of the market for permits has an additional positive eect. depends on the attitude of the industry toward this regulation, which justies the use of free allowances. The prot-neutral permit allocations are mainly analyzed with a general equilibrium approach in the literature. However, two papers focus on this issue in a partial equilibrium framework. Guesnerie et al. (2012) analyze the percentage of permits that a regulator should give for free in order to oset prot losses. They show that in most cases, few permits are required and that free allowances should not even be given with low demand elasticity. We extend this analysis by allowing rms to use abatement technologies. Interestingly, the share of free allowances obtained without abatement may not be an upper bound, as rms may be worse o when they have access to process-integrated abatement than when abatement is not available.
The paper closest to our analysis is Hepburn et al. (2012) , who independently study the eect of introducing a market for emission permits on a product market with imperfect competition. They focus on the free allocation of permits and show that in oligopolistic industries, prot-neutral allowances are partial, as the level of permits allocated for free is lower than total emissions. In some cases, the total industry prots may even increase following the introduction of the market for permits. Although we obtain similar results, there are important dierences between the two papers, and the eects at stake are, therefore, orthogonal. Indeed, Hepburn et al. (2012) focus on the eect on prots of cost asymmetries among rms in the market, whereas we consider a market with identical rms but focus on the role of abatement technologies.
Thus, Hepburn et al. (2012) do not disentangle abatement costs from production costs but merely assume that the lower a rm's total cost is, the lower its emission intensity, i.e., the level of pollution per unit of output, is. In this framework, introducing a market for permits allows for a more ecient allocation of production, from the industry point of view, as the market share of more ecient rms increases, which increases the joint prots in the nal market. In contrast, our result stems from the assumption that dierent abatement technologies induce dierent correlations between the production and abatement decisions of a rm. As a consequence, even in a market with symmetric rms, depending on the abatement technology, it is possible to observe a prot-increasing eect of the permit market. 4 Finally, the paper contributes to the literature that criticizes the introduction of a reserve for entrants. The few papers that study this issue focus essentially on the eect of the reserve on emissions, rather than on competition, and analyze perfectly competitive markets. Besides, the issue raised in this literature is whether entrants should be granted free allowances or not. Ellerman (2008) shows that granting new entrants free allowances leads to excess capacity and to more output, although the eect on emissions is ambiguous. One important question about entrants regards the diusion of environmentally-friendly technologies. Focusing on the French National Allocation Plan, Godard (2005) We depart from this literature in that we do not consider entrants that are more 8 ecient than incumbents. We dene the reserve for entrants as an increase of the cap of permits following entry, and do not analyze at all how these new permits should be distributed to entrants (auctioned or granted for free). We consider the eect of entry on total welfare in an industry with imperfect competition, and show that in some cases, when rms use end-of-pipe abatement technologies, the global pollution cap should be reduced when rms enter the market. Thus, a reserve for entrants should be forbidden in such a case. This issue is orthogonal to that of free allowances to entrants, and our analysis does not preclude the use of such free allowances to diuse new technologies.
Model
Assume that n identical rms compete in quantity. The inverse demand function is P (Q), such that P < 0 and the stability condition given by Seade (1985) is satised:
(n + 1)P (Q) + QP (Q) < 0. Moreover, we denote the elasticity of the demand slope, or demand curvature, by η = P Q P .
When rm i produces a quantity q i , it emits an amountᾱq i of pollution, wherē α > 0 is an exogenous polluting factor that is linked to the production technology. We consider two dierent ways for rms to abate their pollution: end-of-pipe technology and process-integrated technology.
If rm i uses an end-of-pipe technology, then to reduce its emissions from the baseline levelᾱq i to a given target e i , that is, in order to abate pollution by an amount of x i =ᾱq i − e i , the rm has to bear a cost γx 2 i /2, where γ ≥ 0. Note that this type of technology does not modify the production process and, therefore, does not modify the polluting factorᾱ.
The process-integrated abatement technology alters the production process in a more environmentally friendly way and therefore reduces the polluting factor. If rm i invests y i at a cost βy 2 i /2, where β ≥ 0, then its polluting factor becomes α(y i ) =ᾱ−y i . 5
We assume in the following analysis that all rms in the market use the same abatement technology, which is either end-of-pipe abatement or process-integrated abatement. The type of abatement technology that is used is determined by the sector-based characteristics.
The regulator implements a market for permits. A rm must own a permit for each unit of pollution that it emits, and it can buy or sell permits in the market for permits, depending on its needs. We assume that competition in this market is perfect and denote the price of permits by σ. Finally, we consider the social damage caused by pollution to be a linear function of total emissions and denote λ as the marginal damage.
4 Firms' protability and environmental regulation 4.1 Symmetric rms in a closed economy Let us analyze for each type of abatement technology how the market equilibrium is altered by the introduction of the market for permits. This analysis provides insights into the eect of the cap-and-trade system on the prots of rms and therefore into the acceptability of the cap-and-trade system from the point of view of a given industry.
We rst compare each technology to a case without abatement and then compare the two technologies to one another.
End-of-pipe abatement. We rst assume that each rm uses end-of-pipe abatement. The problem of rm i reads:
We can decompose the prot into two parts, each of which depends only on one of the two decision variables: the product market prot given the baseline pollution, (P (Q) −ᾱσ)q i , that determine the optimal output, and an additional gain due to abatement σx i − γx 2 i /2, that determines the optimal abatement level. 6 Interestingly, in this framework, rm i operates as if it produced two independent goods: the nal good in quantity q i , sold on the nal market at price P (Q), and emission permits in quantity x i , sold on the permit market at price σ. The necessary rst-order conditions highlight the independence of q i and x i : 7
(1)
In particular, it is immediately clear that the optimal abatement level is such that the marginal cost of abatement γx i is equal to the revenue from selling one more permit σ. From equation (1), we deduce the symmetric equilibrium individual output q * EP and abatement x * = σ γ , and the total output is equal to Q * EP = nq * EP . The symmetric equilibrium prot of rm i for a given σ is: 8
The variation of π * EP with respect to σ is then:
(2) Proposition 1. When rms use end-of-pipe abatement, then:
-When η > −2, the prot of a rm may decrease or increase with σ;
-When η < −2, the prot of a rm increases with σ.
11
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
Increasing σ has two independent eects on a rm's equilibrium prot. The rst eect is frequently found in the industrial organization literature and corresponds to the eect of σ on the product market prot. An increase in σ increases the nal price and reduces individual and total output, which in most cases reduces rms' revenue.
However, Seade (1985) shows that under some conditions, even this part of the rm's prot may increase following an increase in σ. In other words, the implementation of a permit market helps rms coordinate in order to increase their prices and consequently their prots. This eect depends on the demand curvature. The product market prot increases if and only if η < −2. 9 This prot increasing eect does not exist with linear demand. In contrast, with an isoelastic demand function, prots may increase when the elasticity of demand is low enough. Then, the price increase prevails over the reduction in output.
The second eect is the eect of σ on the gain due to abatement. The higher the permit price is, the more rms abate, and thus, the higher the gain due to abatement is.
10 The intuition is simple. Abatement is independent of production. Firms then abate if and only if it is protable to do so. In other words, abatement may be considered a second protable activity of the rm.
The eect of the permit price on the total prot depends on the trade-o between these two eects. In the case in which η > −2, that is, the standard case of decreasing product market prots, the product market prot is decreasing with σ, whereas the abatement prot is increasing with σ. Depending on the form of the demand function, the total eect of σ on prots may still be positive. In the case of a linear demand, for example, there exists a threshold value of σ such that the equilibrium prot is decreasing with σ below this threshold and increasing with σ otherwise.
Consider now the stage in which the market for pollution permits is opened. The total supply of permits corresponds to the cap E, while the total demand is n(ᾱq * EP −x * ).
The perfectly competitive permit market clears when supply equals demand, and we deduce from this an expression of the eect of the cap E on the equilibrium price of
The eect of E on the equilibrium price of permits is thus, as expected, unambiguously negative, as q * EP always decreases with σ: as regulation becomes more strict, the price of permits increases.
Process-integrated technology. Assuming now that all rms use process-integrated technology, the problem of rm i is:
In this case, we cannot simply separate the "product market" prot from the gain due to abatement, as the abatement and output decisions are interdependent. Indeed, increasing abatement reduces the marginal cost of production perceived by rm i, σ(ᾱ− y i ), and, therefore, aects the output of i. Nevertheless, we can disentangle two eects:
rst, the standard eect of an industry-wide cost increase highlighted by Seade (1985) , that is, the eect of σ on (P (Q) − σ(ᾱ − y i )) q i for a given level of abatement, and, second, the indirect eect of σ on prots through the variation of abatement ∂y * ∂σ .
The necessary rst-order conditions yield:
(3)
We denote the symmetric equilibrium individual output and abatement by q * I and y * , respectively, and denote the total output by Q * I = nq * I . The symmetric equilibrium 13 prot of a rm for a given σ is:
.
The variation of π * I with respect to σ is then equal to:
The rst term of this expression represents the product market eect, or Seade eect, which is more complicated than that with end-of-pipe abatement. The second term represents the net gain of abatement, that is, the dierence between the gain of polluting less for a given cost of pollution and a given output, Proposition 2. When rms use process-integrated abatement, then:
-When η > −2, the prot of a rm decreases with σ;
-When η < −2, the prot of a rm may decrease or increase with σ. In particular, it decreases with σ if the equilibrium output decreases with σ.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
Again, two eects are at stake. Consider rst the product market eect, or the Seade eect. This eect corresponds to the eect of σ on the marginal cost of production, which depends both on the permit price and on the value of the polluting factor.
When rms use process-integrated abatement, the polluting factorᾱ − y * is lower than the polluting factor without abatementᾱ. For this reason, the rst term of equation (4) represents a diminished Seade eect, which results in a less negative (resp. positive) eect of σ in the case in which, absent abatement, the eect of σ on the product market prot is negative (resp. positive).
14 The second term of (4) is the net gain of a variation of abatement by ∂y * ∂σ following an increase in the price of permits. This net gain is negative if and only if the equilibrium abatement level increases with σ. Although the eect of σ on y * is not clear, we have
, from which we can deduce that the equilibrium level of abatement increases with σ as long as the equilibrium individual output does not decrease too much with σ.
This second term implies that if all rms increase their abatement following an increase in the price of permits, they incur an additional net cost. Indeed, while the cost of abatement is completely borne by the rm, the gain of polluting less is partly passed through to consumers because of competition. The share of the cost reduction that rms actually benet from is roughly represented by η+2 n+1+η
, which is positive but decreases with n as long as η > −2. In other words, as competition in the market increases, more of the cost reduction is passed through to consumers. This pass-through results from the prisoners' dilemma: For given prices set by its rivals, rm i's abatement allows it to reduce its price and gain market shares. At the symmetric equilibrium, however, all rms abate the same amount so that competition becomes ercer. One particular case is the monopoly case, where the two eects cancel out, and the net gain of abatement is zero. Indeed, this is the only market structure in which the rm can fully benet from its gain in eciency.
Eventually, we nd that in the most standard case, when total prots decrease with σ without abatement, they do so too even when rms use process-integrated abatement.
Consider now the stage in which the market for pollution permits is opened. The total supply of permits corresponds to the cap E, while the total demand is n(ᾱ − y * (σ))q * I (σ). The market clears when supply equals demand, and we deduce from this 15 an expression of the eect of the cap E on the equilibrium price of permits σ * I :
Obviously, ∂σ * I ∂E carries the same sign as that of the eect of σ on total pollution costs (ᾱ−y * )σq * I , since total supply is inelastic with respect to σ. As for all costs, the eect of σ on pollution costs is twofold: it aects the marginal cost of pollution (ᾱ − y * )σ, which corresponds to the second term on the left-hand side of equation (5), and it also aects output q * I and hence total costs, which corresponds to the rst term on the left-hand side of equation (5). Eventually, it is dicult to derive general conclusions, but we nd that if abatement increases and output decreases with σ, the price of permits decreases with E. In particular, with linear demand, σ always decreases with E.
Comparison of the two technologies In the previous analysis, we only compared the prots for each technology to the prot that rms would earn if no technology was available. In order to make the two technologies properly comparable, we focus on cases in which the same cost of abatement induces the same level of abatement. We leave aside the equilibrium on the permit market. As we consider industries that are in the same permit market, we assume that the price of permits is identical for all industries, regardless of their abatement technology. Lemma 1. In equilibrium, with both technologies, for the same price of permits, the same individual level of abatement induces the same total cost of abatement.
We obviously cannot consider a case in which the same cost is incurred with both technologies for any level of abatement, as this would simply amount to having two identical technologies. We therefore limit our analysis to the equilibrium path and assume in what follows that we have the same equilibrium level of total abatement in both cases; that is, x * = y * q * I . As we know already that x * = σ γ and y * = σ β q * I , we have unique expressions of output and investment (y) in the case of process-integrated abatement and can deduce the total costs of abatement for both technologies:
On the equilibrium path, for any value of σ, the same level of abatement induces the same cost for both technologies. It is thus relevant to compare the two technologies in this particular case.
In addition, as we now have expressions of y * and q * I as functions of σ, γ and β, we can simplify equation (4):
The latter expression can easily be compared to the corresponding expression for the end-of-pipe technology, given by equation (2):
It is immediately clear that the rst term on the right-hand side of both equations is identical, except for the equilibrium output. The rst-order conditions on output ensure that for all values of the parameters, for the same number of rms in the industry, the individual output is larger with process-integrated abatement than with end-of-pipe abatement. The second term is always lower with process-integrated abatement and is negative as long as η < n−3. We can now compare the two technologies, distinguishing between two cases: η < −2 and η > −2.
Proposition 3. Assume that in equilibrium, rms set the same level of abatement regardless of the technology at hand. Then, when η > −2, the prot of rms decreases more with σ when rms use process-integrated abatement than when they use end-of-pipe abatement.
The most standard case is η > −2, as it is typically the case in which the product market prot is decreasing with σ. In this case, we have already shown that the total prot of a rm may still increase with σ with end-of-pipe abatement because of the prot from the permit market. From equation (6), we see that with process-integrated abatement, the negative eect is reinforced because of the higher output, and at the same time, the positive eect is diminished because rms pass through part of their cost gain to the consumers. As a result, in this standard case, when both technologies imply an equal abatement level and equal abatement costs, industries using processintegrated abatement are aected to a greater extent by the cap-and-trade system than those using end-of-pipe abatement. If η < n − 3, then the eect of the cap-and-trade system on industries with process-integrated abatement is negative for all σ.
Proposition 4. Assume that in equilibrium, rms set the same level of abatement regardless of the technology at hand. Then, when η < −2, the prot of rms increases with σ when rms use end-of-pipe abatement, whereas it may increase or decrease with σ when they use process-integrated abatement.
In the less common case, in which η < −2, the eect of the cap-and-trade system on rms using end-of-pipe abatement is unambiguously positive because both the product market prot and the permit market prot increase with σ. With process-integrated abatement, the product market prot increases even more than with end-of-pipe abatement. Indeed, as the equilibrium output of a rm is larger with process-integrated abatement than with end-of-pipe abatement, the eect of σ on the product market prot, represented by η+2 (n+1)+ηᾱ q * k (k = EP, I) is always greater, independently of the sign of this eect. In addition, when η < −2, the sign of this term is positive. In contrast, in this case, the eect of σ on the prots resulting solely from abatement, summarized by the term σ γ η+3−n n+1+η
, is negative, as η + 3 − n ≤ 0 and n + 1 + η > 0. The total eect of the cap-and-trade system on industries using process-integrated abatement is thus ambiguous when η < −2.
Finally, it is important to note that it cannot be that the cap-and-trade system is more lenient on rms using process-integrated abatement, unless both industries benet from the cap-and-trade system. Whenever the cap-and-trade system has a negative eect on prots with at least one abatement technology, the system is more lenient with end-of-pipe abatement. In other words, in cases in which a regulator should worry about the acceptability of the cap-and-trade system, it should always worry more about industries using process-integrated technology.
Extensions
We now test the robustness of our results to two alternative assumptions. First, we consider price competition instead as quantity competition. Second, we determine the eect of foreign competition, in the form of a competitive fringe of rms that are not subject to the cap-and-trade system. Note that in both extensions, we only focus on the eect of the price of permits on nal prices, abatement and prots; that is, we will not analyze the opening of the permit market.
Price competition Assume in this part that rms now compete in price. To this end, we follow the analysis of Anderson et al. (2001) , who study the eect a (unit or ad valorem) tax on a dierentiated product oligopoly and derive a result similar to that of Seade (1985) in a model of price competition. We assume again that there are n rms in the market. Demand functions are symmetrically dierentiated. D(p i , p −i ) denotes the demand for product i given the price of i p i and the prices of all other goods p −i .
D is such that ∂D ∂p i < 0 and ∂D ∂p −i > 0. Abatement costs are as presented in Section 3.
Following Anderson et al. (2001) , we use the following notations: Assume rst that rms use end-of-pipe abatement. The problem of rm i is then:
As with quantity competition, the product market prot given the baseline pollution and the abatement opportunity prot are separable. The rst-order conditions are:
We thus still have x * (σ) = σ γ . As rms are symmetrically dierentiated, the equilibrium price is identical for all rms and denoted by p * EP (σ). We denote the corresponding individual prot by:
Therefore, as with quantity competition, the abatement opportunity prot increases with the price of permits and does not depend on the rm's production. The eect of σ on the product market prot depends on the value ofẼ.
The variation of the equilibrium price p * EP with respect to σ is given by:
which corresponds to the conditions in Anderson et al. (2001) and implies that the price increases with σ for all values of the parameters. From this, we can deduce, as they do, that the variation of (p * −ᾱσ) carries the same sign as that ofẼ − 1 and that the variation of the product market prot carries the same sign as that ofẼ − 2. More precisely, the eect of σ on the total prot is given by:
IfẼ > 2, then both the product market prot and the abatement opportunity prot increase with σ. IfẼ < 2, then the product market prot decreases with σ, whereas the abatement opportunity prot still increases with σ. As with quantity competition, there exists a threshold value of σ such that the total prot of a rm increases with σ (and thus with the strictness of the cap-and-trade system) above this threshold.
Consider now that rms use process-integrated abatement. As with quantity com-petition, this case is more complicated because a change in the abatement decision y i resulting from a change in σ will also aect the nal price p i set by rm i. The problem of rm i is:
The rst-order conditions are:
We denote the individual equilibrium prot by:
The variation of the equilibrium price p * I with respect to σ is given by:
from which we can deduce that if the abatement level y * is decreasing with σ, then the nal price p * I is increasing with σ, and in contrast, if p * I is decreasing with σ, then y * is increasing with σ.
Finally, we can make some comments based on the following expressions of ∂π * I ∂σ :
From equation (7), we nd that if the price decreases with σ, then the equilibrium prot of a rm also decreases with σ (regardless of the value ofẼ). From equation (8), we obtain the comparative statics on prots if the nal price is increasing with σ, knowing then that ∂y * ∂σ < 0:
-IfẼ < 2, then the prot is decreasing with σ.
-IfẼ > 2, there are two contradictory eects: given the level of pollution, the prot tends to increase through the Seade eect (or, in this case, the Anderson et al. eect). In contrast, with end-of-pipe abatement, the reduction of abatement following an increase in the permit price diminishes the Seade eect by reducing the price increase.
Therefore, we can see that the same eects are at play, regardless of the competition format. In particular, in the most standard case, whenẼ < 2, the prot always decreases with σ with process-integrated abatement, whereas it may increase with σ with end-of-pipe abatement.
International competition. Assume now that rms compete in quantity again and that the n domestic rms subject to the cap-and-trade system are also competing with a competitive fringe of foreign rms. The latter rms are not subject to the cap-andtrade system, however (i.e., they do not have to buy permits in order to emit pollution).
We assume that this competitive fringe of foreign rms do not have access to abatement and have a production cost function C : q f → C(q f ). C is twice dierentiable, strictly increasing and strictly convex.
Consider rst that rms use end-of-pipe abatement. The problem of rm i is:
with Q = q f + n i=1 q i the total quantity supplied. The problem of the fringe of foreign rms is:
23 with P given, as the fringe of rms are assumed price takers.
We still obtain x * (σ) = σ γ , and as the home (strategic) rms are identical, the equilibrium output is symmetric for all i and is still denoted by q * EP (σ). Q * EP (σ) still denotes the total equilibrium output; that is, Q *
denotes the total output of home rms. Finally, the equilibrium prot of rm i is
As before, we want to determine how the equilibrium prot of a home rm is aected by an increase in the permit price σ. This variation is given by:
The only dierence from the case without a foreign fringe of rms is that now we have
We compute this by acknowledging that for any σ it is always true that at equilibrium ∂π i ∂q i = 0 and that P (Q * EP ) − C (q * f ) = 0. Deriving the latter expression with respect to σ, we obtain the following equation:
from which we obtain an expression of the eect of σ on the domestic rms' prot:
denotes the market share of domestic rms and thus is always within the 24 interval [0, 1]. In this framework, the product market prot of the home rms increases with the cap-and-trade system if and only if:
These conditions are more constraining than those found in the case without the fringe of foreign rms because θ < C −P C . As the eect of σ on the permit market prot is unchanged, international competition unsurprisingly diminishes the potential positive eect of the cap-and-trade system on domestic rms' prots when rms use end-of-pipe abatement.
With process-integrated abatement, the analysis is more ambiguous. The rstorder conditions for the domestic rms are given by equations (3), and the rst-order conditions for the fringe of rms are the same as those with end-of-pipe abatement.
The eect of σ on domestic rms' prots is then given by:
As with end-of-pipe abatement, the product market prot is less likely to increase with σ in the presence of unregulated foreign competition. The eect of this new competition on the net gain of abatement (the second term of the equation) is ambiguous, however:
In particular, if the inverse demand function is convex (if η < 0), then the net eect of abatement on prots is greater (whether positive or negative) in the presence of international competition than without it.
5 Adjustment of the global pollution cap to entry
In the former section, we have shown that the eect on environmental regulation on the incumbents is contingent on the type of abatement technology they use. In this section, we focus on the policy of the regulator towards entry, and show that the environmental policy must adapt to entry. As for incumbents, policy regarding entry should be adjusted depending on the type of abatement technology that is used in the industry. Nevertheless, the regulator should adapt policy by changing the cap of pollution rather than the level of free allowances for entrants. We analyze this point by doing comparative static of the pollution cap over the number of rms.
In order to emphasize the eect of entry on a regulator's decisions, we focus on the adjustment of the global pollution cap when the regulator implements a Pigovian price of permits, that is, sets σ to be equal to the marginal damage of pollution, not the optimal price of permits. The use of a Pigovian price simplies the analysis tremendously. We will, however, discuss the use of an optimal permit price at the end of this Section.
Proposition 5. A regulator's optimal policy toward entry is contingent on the abatement technology that is available in the industry. As the number of rms in the market increases, the regulator that implements a Pigovian price of permits:
-reduces or increases the cap of permits available in the industry with end-of-pipe abatement,
-increases the cap of permits available in the industry with process-integrated technology.
Proposition 5 results from the fact that an increase in the number of rms does not have the same eect on the marginal cost of reducing emissions when rms use end-of-pipe abatement and when they use process-integrated technology. As in the previous section, for clarity, we consider the two technologies separately.
Consider rst that rms use end-of-pipe abatement. The equilibrium in the market for permits is given by:
Given that σ is the Pigovian price and is, therefore, unaected by n, the eect of the market structure on the emission cap that will be set by the regulator is simply given by:
Even if the regulator only corrects the environmental externality, it should still adapt the cap to entry. We show in Appendix B that the total output Q * EP increases with the number of rms. The market structure thus has two contradictory eects on the emission cap. The rst results from an increase in the level of output and hence of pollution, everything else being equal. The second, in contrast, is due to the increase in total abatement.
On the one hand, when the number of rms increases, the total output Q * EP increases, which leads to an increase in pollution ofᾱ ∂Q * EP ∂n . As a result, for a given cap of permits E, the marginal abatement cost for society increases as more rms enter the market. Since the marginal gain of polluting less is xed to the marginal damage of pollution, the optimal cap of permits is increasing with n: when a rm enters the market, the regulator wants to apply more lenient environmental regulation.
On the other hand, as we have seen in the previous section, the individual abatement level with end-of-pipe abatement is unaected by the structure of the market for permits and only depends on the relationship between the marginal gain of selling permits on the permit market and the marginal cost of abatement, i.e., on σ and γ. When rms use end-of-pipe abatement technology, they always individually abate the same amount of pollution regardless of the number of rms in the market when the permit price is exogenous; then, the aggregate demand for permits decreases with n. Therefore, the equilibrium price of permits decreases with n as well. As a result, for a given cap of permits E, the marginal abatement cost for society decreases as more rms enter the market. The cap of permits if the regulator implements a Pigovian price of permits is thus decreasing with n: when a rm enters the market, the regulator wants to apply more severe environmental regulation.
Consider now that rms use process-integrated abatement. The equilibrium in the market for permits is given by:
The eect of the number of rms on the cap set by the regulator is thus:
We show again in Appendix B that under reasonable conditions, ∂Q * I ∂n > 0 and ∂y * ∂n < 0.
From this, it is immediately clear that the cap set by the regulator is increasing with n with process-integrated abatement.
Indeed, as with end-of-pipe abatement, an increase in the number of rms increases total output and thus pollution, everything else being equal. The eect of n on abatement, however, is dierent with process-integrated abatement than with end-of-pipe abatement. Indeed, as the number of rms increases, a rm's marginal gain to abate pollution decreases: reducing its marginal cost of production by a given amount dy in-creases a rm's market share even more since the market is more concentrated. Firms thus have an incentive to set a lower abatement level y * as n increases, which increases the aggregate demand for permits. Therefore, the equilibrium price of permits increases with n, and for a given cap of permits E, the marginal abatement cost for society increases with n as well. As a consequence, the optimal cap of permits increases with n:
with more rms in the market, the regulator wants to impose a lighter burden on rms.
Thus, when the regulator implements a price of permits equal to the Pigovian tax, the cap of permits may increase or decrease with the number of rms with end-of-pipe abatement and should always increase with process-integrated abatement.
In the case in which the regulator should increase the number of permits that are available when the number of rms increases, it may foresee a reserve of permits that are available to potential entrants, hence increasing the ocial caps of emissions in the event of rms' entry. We thus provide a new justication for the existence of a reserve of permits. In contrast, in the case in which the regulator should reduce the cap of permits when rms enter the market, we propose a dierent system: if necessary, the regulator may buy permits from incumbents with a preemption right and sell or give a share of these to entrants. Therefore, although the total number of permits that are available to rms then decreases, the entrants have now access to the market.
Discussion
We assess the robustness of our results. We rst focus on the optimal degree of regulation and then analyze how free allowances for entrants may be used to diuse technology.
Until now, we have assumed that the permit price is equal to the Pigovian tax.
However, since we consider a market with imperfect competition, we extend our results to the case of optimal regulation. Indeed, we know from Barnett (1980) that in presence of market power, a regulator does not implement a Pigovian tax. Let us assume that the regulator maximizes a welfare function, taking into account the environmental damage of pollution. As before, we assume that the marginal damage of pollution is constant.
We show in Appendix C that with both end-of-pipe abatement and process-integrated abatement, the optimal permit price is lower than the marginal damage of pollution. Now focusing on the comparative statics of the permit price with respect to n, we know that under perfect competition, the optimal permit price is equal to the marginal damage. Therefore, the optimal permit price increases with the number of rms.
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When the regulator applies optimal regulation, there is an additional eect relative to the implementation of the Pigovian price, which induces the regulator with both endof-pipe abatement and process-integrated abatement to reduce the pollution cap as the number of rms increases. In other words, the conditions under which the regulator can implement a reserve for entrants are less likely to be fullled.
However, the free allowances given to entrants are ordinarily considered a tool for regulators to diuse technology. This is the case in the European Union, where energy intensive sectors are already well settled and innovation can only be gradual. The reserve for entrants is ordinarily designed to facilitate entry. Thus, the entrants will be able to choose the appropriate level of technology. However, this approach is orthogonal to ours. A reserve for entrants is at the same time an adjustment of the cap to entry and the free allowances dedicated to entrants. The standard approach in the literature is to have free allowances for entrants and not to adjust the pollution cap to entry. We thus recommend that the pollution cap be adapted to entry if a regulator implements a Pigovian price of permits. However, it is possible to design mechanisms such that the pollution cap is adjusted and entrants receive free allowances. Indeed, the preemption system that we propose may be designed such that allowances are bought by the regulator and given to entrants for free.
Conclusion
This paper has two main ndings. First, we show that the eect of an environmental regulation depends on the type of abatement technology that is available to rms. In some cases, implementing an environmental regulation may increase prots in the industries subject to the regulation, particularly those of rms using end-of-pipe abatement.
This conclusion is consistent with the changes that we currently observe in decision making concerning environmental regulation. In the case of the EU ETS, for instance, the rules agreed upon for the 2013-2020 period show a clear change of direction regarding the allocation of permits. In particular, producers of electric power, which, in previous phases, received 100% of their permits for free, will now have to buy 100% of their permits through auctions.
Second, we emphasize that the type of abatement technology of the new entrants should be taken into account by the regulator when adapting the pollution cap to entry.
Importantly, we show that the adjustment may go both ways, in that the regulator should not only have access to a reserve of permits but also be able to reduce the pollution cap following the entry of a rm. 2 Free grandfathered allowances are a means to reduce prot losses, which is necessary for the success of a new cap-and-trade system.
3 Note that the problem that we consider is orthogonal to the issue of giving free allowances to entrants: we merely focus on how to adjust the emission cap to entry.
only depends on the dierence between the initial and nal pollution factors y i . It is possible to show that our results hold qualitatively with that specication.
6 Note that the prot can be decomposed into two parts because the abatement cost only depends on the abatement level x i and not directly on the rm's output q i .
7 Sucient second-order conditions are always satised and hence omitted in the following analysis. Appendix A Comparative statics with respect to σ
We determine the eect of the price of permits σ on x * , y * , q * i and Q * i (i ∈ {EP, I}). We consider rst the case of end-of-pipe abatement and then the case of process integrated abatement.
A.1 End-of-pipe abatement
The problem of rm i is:
First order conditions are given by equation (1), and we obtain x * (σ) = σ γ . As rms are identical, the equilibrium output is symmetric for all i and denoted by q * EP (σ). We denote the total equilibrium output by Q * EP (σ) = nq * EP (σ) and π * EP (σ) = π i (q * EP (σ), x * (σ)) the corresponding equilibrium prot.
The eect of σ on the equilibrium prot is given by:
As σ changes, rm i changes its output q i so that we still have ∂π i ∂q i = 0. Therefore, at equilibrium, we can write: 
A.2 Process integrated technology
First order conditions are given by equation (3). We obtain y * (σ) = σ β q * I (σ), and as rms are identical, the equilibrium output is symmetric for all i and denoted by q * I (σ).
We denote the total equilibrium output by Q * I (σ) = nq * I (σ) and π * I (σ) = π i (q * I (σ), y * (σ)) the corresponding equilibrium prot.
We then use the same method as in the end-of-pipe case to nd an expression of (17)
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Deriving ∂π i ∂q i with respect to σ at the equilibrium values yields:
If η < −2, then the product market prot increases with σ whereas the net gain of additional abatement is negative. The total eect is ambiguous.
B Comparative statics with respect to n
We now determine the eect of n on x * , y * , q * i , Q * i (i ∈ {EP, I}) and E * I .
B.1 End-of-pipe abatement
Deriving the rst order conditions with respect to n, we obtain: 
B.2 Process integrated technology.
We show here that in the case of process integrated technology, E * I always increases with n. Henceforth, we assume that η > −n and that P (Q * I ) >ᾱσ. This is not always the case: the actual condition should be P (Q * I ) > (ᾱ − y * )σ, which implies that we can have P −ᾱσ < 0, in which case we have also P + σ 2 /β > 0. This may imply ∂q * I ∂n > 0 and always implies ∂Q * I ∂n < 0. It is thus better and more reasonable to keep P + σ 2 β < 0.
We rst deduce from the rst order conditions that:
We can now determine an expression of the derivative of q * I with respect to n and deduce 40 comparative statics results.
Deriving ∂π i ∂q i with respect to n at the equilibrium values yields: 
Since η > −n and P + σ 2 β < 0, it is immediate the 
C Optimal regulation
We assume then that the regulator maximizes a welfare function and corrects two distortions: the environmental externality and market power. Total welfare is thus given by:
where CS is the consumers' surplus, π i the prot of rm i and RR the regulator's revenue. We analyze then the optimal permits price for each abatement technology.
C.1 End-of-pipe abatement
In the case of end-of-pipe abatement, the welfare at the product market equilibrium for a given price of permits σ is given by:
The optimal value of σ is then given by the rst order condition: 
from which we can deduce that the optimal tax σ opt EP is lower than λ, i.e. lower than the Pigovian tax. Indeed, if it were not, then we would have ((σ − λ)α − P q * EP ) ∂Q * EP ∂σ < 0, hence n γ (σ − λ) < 0 which would imply σ < λ, hence a contradiction.
C.2 Process-integrated abatement
In the case of process-integrated abatement, the welfare at the product market equilibrium for a given price of permits σ is given by:
∂W

